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RETHINKING THE CORPORATION (AND
RACE) IN AMERICA: CAN LAW (AND
PROFESSIONALIZATION) FIX "MINOR"
PROBLEMS OF EXTERNALIZATION,
INTERNALIZATION, AND GOVERNANCE?
STEVEN A. RAMIREZ
INTRODUCTION
Much misconduct has been laid at the doorstep of the
modern corporation, particularly in light of a historic surge in
corporate corruption beginning in 2001.1 On many levels, this
has resulted in a healthy rethinking of the premises of the
modern corporation and whether some degree of legal
restructuring is needed. 2 This Article takes a different path. It
focuses on what is right about the modern publicly held
corporation and attempts to decouple these attributes from the
t Professor of Law, Washburn University School of Law; Director, Washburn
Business & Transactional Law Center.
1 See The Ethics of Business, ECONOMIST, Jan. 22, 2005, at 20-21 (linking the
rise of the so-called corporate social responsibility movement to the corporate
scandals of the early years of the twenty-first century); Trials and Errors,
ECONOMIST.COM, Jan. 14, 2005, http://www.economist.com/agenda/
displaystory.cfm?story-id=3572974 (noting the increased volume of criminal
prosecutions arising from corporate frauds, along with the harsher sentences
brought about by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, but questioning whether such
criminal exposure will serve to clean up corporate America or just deter executives
from taking risks).
2 See, e.g., LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL, CORPORATE IRRESPONSIBILITY: AMERICA'S
NEWEST EXPORT 276-78 (2001) (finding that American corporations are plagued by
a focus on short term profitability and that the law is limited in its ability to address
this central failing); Roberta S. Karmel, Should a Duty to the Corporation Be
Imposed on Institutional Shareholders?, 60 BUs. LAW. 1, 3, 18-21 (2004) (proposing
fiduciary duties for institutional investors and stating that so long as Sarbanes-
Oxley reforms are imposed upon a shareholder primacy model of corporate
governance, they are not likely to prevent future episodes of corporate corruption);
Adam Winkler, Corporate Law or the Law of Business?: Stakeholders and Corporate
Governance at the End of History, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 109, 111 (2004)
(arguing that dilution of shareholder primacy norms expands managerial discretion
and does not necessarily operate to protect other stakeholders).
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debate about what needs to be fixed.3 It therefore attempts to
show that much of this "blame game" is ill-founded and
misdirected.4 It instead argues for a more austere restructuring
that would actually transcend the corporation per se and focuses
on the apparent locus of the difficulties-the management of the
large, publicly held business enterprise. 5
The misdeeds commonly attributed to the corporation are
hardly inherent to the corporation, or the inexorable result of
exclusive attributes of the corporation. 6  The essence of the
modern corporation consists of two important elements: (1)
limited liability; and (2) the ability to lock in capital regardless of
the desires of individual owners or creditors.7 Combined with the
shareholder primacy principle, which holds that a corporation
operates chiefly for the benefit of stockholders,8 these elements
have maximized the flow of capital from passive investors to
3 See Douglas Litowitz, Are Corporations Evil?, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 811, 829
(2004) ("The endless focus on large multinational corporations is a tacit admission
that small corporations are not correlated with evil, thereby raising the possibility
that wrongdoing is more accurately tied to some factor other than corporate
status.").
4 Perhaps the most extreme voice against corporations is the highly successful
litigator Gerry Spence. See GERRY SPENCE, FROM FREEDOM TO SLAVERY: THE
REBIRTH OF TYRANNY IN AMERICA 71 (1993) (stating that corporations are
"inherently evil").
5 Litowitz, supra note 3, at 815 (promoting the idea of "looking beyond
individuals and beyond corporations to the pernicious effect of large institutions
staffed by desperate and pliant workers"). This Article uses "public corporation" or
"publicly held corporation" to mean a corporation which has shares that are traded
on a national securities exchange and is required to register with the Securities and
Exchange Commission ("SEC"). See 26 U.S.C. § 162(m)(2) (2000) (defining "publicly
held corporation"); 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g-1 (2005) (allowing exemption from
registration for non-traded securities).
6 Typically, scholars today associate five attributes, common transnationally,
with the corporation: (1) legal personality; (2) limited liability; (3) transferable
shares; (4) centralized management; and (5) shared investor ownership. REINIER
KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND
FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 5 (2004).
7 See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of
Organizational Law, 110 YALE L.J. 387, 393 (2000) (claiming that partitioning assets
from claims allowed businesses to be assured that assets were permanently
committed to venture); see also Margaret M. Blair, Locking in Capital: What
Corporate Law Achieved for Business Organizers in the Nineteenth Century, 51
UCLA L. REV. 387, 389-90, 454 (2003) (suggesting that limited liability and the
ability to pledge capital to an institution for lengthy periods of time, free of claims of
individual owners, were keys to why corporations developed into the central means
of organizing business activity in the nineteenth century).
8 See Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919) ("A business
corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the stockholders.").
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productive enterprises and rightfully make the corporation a
candidate for the "greatest single discovery of modern times."9
These elements explain why society has, and needs, the modern
corporation. 10 These elements need not be associated with the
misconduct that corporations happen to perpetrate. Nor do these
elements logically create inappropriate incentives or proclivities
toward such misconduct.
This is not to say there are no structural problems with the
modern corporation. The corporation is a profit-maximizing
institution.' As such, it will rationally seek to externalize as
many costs associated with its activities that it possibly can
within the bounds of the law. 12 This is the cost externalization
9 Nina A. Mendelson, A Control-Based Approach to Shareholder Liability for
Corporate Torts, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1203, 1209 n.14 (2002) (quoting William J.
Rands, Domination of a Subsidiary by a Parent, 32 IND. L. REV. 421, 423 (1999)
(quoting unnamed Columbia University president)). Other commentators have
stated that the corporation is the "most important organization in the world" and
"the best hope for the future of the rest of the world." JOHN MICKLETHWAIT &
ADRIAN WOOLDRIDGE, THE COMPANY: A SHORT HISTORY OF A REVOLUTIONARY IDEA,
at xv (2003).
10 Much discussion over time has focused on the efficiency of limited liability.
See generally MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS
ORGANIZATIONS 234-36 (9th ed., unabr. 2005) (showing that scholars have had
difficulty in justifying the efficiency of limited liability in the case of tort creditors,
but have recognized the advantages when dealing with contract creditors). From an
efficiency perspective, however, tort law does not generally impound costs associated
with activities upon individuals lacking control. Since shareholders are stripped of
control, it is not necessarily efficient to impose costs upon them for the conduct of the
corporation. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2001) (stating that the business and
affairs of corporations are to be managed by the board of directors). It would appear
sufficient for the corporation, in terms of allocative efficiency, to impound such costs
on the corporation itself so that management can weigh the costs and benefits of
particular conduct. In those relatively rare circumstances where inefficiency may
result from the limited liability of non-control individuals, these costs seem well
outweighed by the macroeconomic effects of limited liability in achieving a lower cost
of capital. See generally Steven A. Ramirez, The Law and Macroeconomics of the
New Deal at 70, 62 MD. L. REV. 515, 517 (2003) (highlighting the need for the law to
provide macroeconomic legal infrastructure that operates to lower the cost of
capital). There can be little doubt that limited liability insulates passive
shareholders from virtually any risk of liability and thus leads to a lower cost of
capital. I do not in this Article undertake to prove that the macroeconomic benefits
of limited liability outweigh losses from allocative inefficiency, but given the
transnational pervasiveness of limited liability, it would appear that it does.
11 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
§ 2.01(a) (1994) (declaring that "a corporation... should have as its objective the
conduct of business activities with a view to enhancing corporate profit and
shareholder gain").
12 Id. § 2.01(b)(1) (maintaining that even if unprofitable, a corporation must still
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issue. Similarly, a corporation will fail to see and exploit socially
desirable investments which yield external benefits in excess of
costs if it cannot internalize sufficient benefits to justify its
investment costs. 13 This is the benefit internalization issue.
There are also problems associated with corporate governance. A
chief executive officer ("CEO") of a modern corporation will often
wield tremendous economic power and be tempted to use such
power to enrich himself without regard to the welfare of the
corporation. 14 This is the agency costs issue. These three issues
pose economic challenges to the institutional structure of the
corporation, but they do not give rise, inevitably, to the corporate
misbehavior that has been a recurring historical experience.
Because these issues transcend the corporation and are not
inherent to the corporation, I term these problems "minor"
problems even though I recognize they impose major economic
costs. Essentially, these problems go to the management of the
public corporation rather than corporate structure per se. Thus,
the challenge to the law is to permit society to exploit fully the
benefits of the corporation while minimizing the costs associated
with externalization, internalization, and governance.
This Article seeks to highlight these central points, in the
specific context of race in America. 15 Part I will seek to show
what is right and wrong with the modern corporation. Part II
will demonstrate, in general, how the law should respond to this
realization of the fundamental strengths and the more "minor"
weaknesses of the modern corporation. Part III will apply these
lessons to the problems of race in America in 2005. The Article
act according to the law). Under the American Law Institute's principles of corporate
governance, a corporation "may," but is not required to, curtail its profit-seeking
activities in accordance with "ethical considerations." Id. § 2.01(b)(2).
13 See ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 473-74 (Prometheus Books 1991)
(1776) (stating that private actors will forgo certain investments if benefits cannot
be sufficiently captured by any single actor to justify investment costs).
14 See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm:
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305,
306 (1976) ("It is generally impossible for the principal or the agent at zero cost to
ensure that the agent will make optimal decisions from the principal's viewpoint.").
The problem of agency costs within the corporation has bedeviled shareholders and
scholars from the very incipiency of corporate power. See MICKLETHWAIT &
WOOLDRIDGE, supra note 9, at xviii.
15 Race is an excellent context in which to test the power of any theory of
corporate reform because it has rightfully been termed the nation's "oldest and most
intractable problem." Richard Delgado, Derrick Bell and the Ideology of Racial
Reform: Will We Ever Be Saved?, 97 YALE L.J. 923, 923 (1988).
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concludes that law plays an important role in the dementia of
corporate wrongdoing but that the legal foundation of the
corporation itself is not to blame. Instead, the blame lies largely
in the legal infrastructure (or lack thereof) surrounding the
corporation. 16 The real question that recent corporate
misconduct raises is whether it is now past time to insist upon
professional management of publicly held companies.
17
This Article suggests a road map for racial reformers
thinking about the central role that the corporation has played in
our economy. It is certainly the case that as the central economic
institution in America, the public corporation transmits and
amplifies racial oppression and inequality resulting from race.
18
When, on May 17, 1954,19 America finally turned its back on
large-scale apartheid ensconced in law,20 virtually all the capital
locked into corporate America was racist capital, dominated and
controlled by a racially exclusive power elite.21 Nevertheless, the
problem in terms of race is not the foundation of our corporate
16 This may explain why virtually all "economically important jurisdictions"
have legally fabricated entities akin to the American corporation insofar as its
essential attributes are concerned. See KRAAKMAN ET AL., supra note 6, at 5.
17 The author proposes a professional management system for corporations
similar to that of the securities brokerage industry. See Steven A. Ramirez, The
Professional Obligations of Securities Brokers Under Federal Law: An Antidote for
Bubbles?, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 527, 532, 537-38 (2002) (describing the role of federal
law in curbing misconduct of professional broker-dealers).
's See Steven A. Ramirez, Games CEOs Play and Interest Convergence Theory:
Why Diversity Lags in America's Boardrooms and What To Do About It, 61 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 1583, 1590-92 (2004) (explaining how the process of allowing a CEO to
pick the board of directors "effectively perpetuates yesteryear's tradition of racial
apartheid").
19 On May 17, 1954, Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), was
decided. It held that separate was not equal and school segregation based on race
denied African-American children educational opportunities. Id. at 493.
20 It was not until June 12, 1967 that the United States Supreme Court struck
down state statutes prohibiting interracial marriage. See Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1, 12 (1967) ("To deny [the] fundamental freedom [of marriage] on so
unsupportable a basis as the racial classifications embodied in these statutes ... is
surely to deprive all the State's citizens of liberty without due process of law.").
21 The first African-American director of a Fortune 500 company was elected on
June 23, 1964. RICHARD L. ZWEIGENHAFT & G. WILLIAM DOMHOFF, DIVERSITY IN
THE POWER ELITE: HAVE WOMEN AND MINORITIES REACHED THE TOP? 78 (1998).
Even as recently as 1980, one study of the demographic background of the corporate
elite estimated that there were only ten African-American directors. THOMAS R.
DYE, WHO'S RUNNING AMERICA?: THE BUSH RESTORATION 278 (5th ed. 1990). The
senior executive ranks were apparently even more racially exclusive-as of 1980
only three of 1700 senior managers were African American. ZWEIGENHAFr &
DOMHOFF, supra, at 89.
ST. JOHN'S LAWREVIEW
structure but the apex of that structure. 22  Specifically, our
system of corporate governance is dysfunctional in terms of
permitting excessive externalization, allowing systematic failure
to internalize mass investment benefits, and permitting
managers to enrich and entrench themselves at the expense of
shareholders. 23 Indeed, governance is so dysfunctional as to have
transmogrified shareholder primacy into CEO primacy.24 Our
system of CEO primacy is fraught with problems, particularly
with respect to race.
I. WHAT IS RIGHT AND WHAT IS WRONG WITH THE MODERN
CORPORATION
This part of the Article will attempt to articulate a unified
economic theory of the corporation as a means of isolating
strengths and weaknesses of the corporate structure from a
microeconomic and macroeconomic perspective. At its
foundation, this means showing that limited liability and the
ability to lock in capital serve to enhance efficiency as well as
22 CEOs are tempted to use homogeneity in general and racial homogeneity in
particular in strategic ways that serve to enhance their power and compensation.
See Ramirez, supra note 18, at 1589-91, 1613 (noting that "executives will seek to fill
boards with demographic and cultural reproductions of themselves").
23 If a CEO succumbs to the temptation to use race strategically as an
instrument to enhance power and compensation, this would compromise his ability
to lead a corporation to exploit diversity in a profit-maximizing manner. See Steven
A. Ramirez, Diversity and the Boardroom, 6 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 85, 118-19 (2000)
[hereinafter Ramirez, Diversity]. It will also undermine board performance. See
Steven A. Ramirez, A Flaw in the Sarbanes-Oxley Reform: Can Diversity in the
Boardroom Quell Corporate Corruption?, 77 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 837, 845-56 (2003)
[hereinafter Ramirez, Flaw in Reform] (emphasizing how board diversity leads to
enhanced scrutiny and monitoring which result in better board performance and
increased value to shareholders).
24 JOHN BOGLE, THE BATTLE FOR THE SOUL OF CAPITALISM 28 (2005) (stating
that a "pathological mutation" has gripped corporate governance as owners'
capitalism has become managers' capitalism and executive compensation soared
resulting in the transfer of trillions in wealth from shareholders to CEOs and other
insiders). The CEO typically holds ultimate control over management and decisive
control over the selection of directors. See Thomas W. Joo, A Trip Through the Maze
of "Corporate Democracy" Shareholder Voice and Management Composition, 77 ST.
JOHN'S L. REV. 735, 744-47 (2003) (demonstrating the very weak voting rights of
shareholders). This Article does not address the issue of whether the CEO is
typically the most highly compensated individual associated with the vast majority
of public companies, including any individual shareholder. Nevertheless, it is clear
that executive compensation has grown dramatically as legal constraints upon
management have succumbed to special interest power held by corporate managers.
See infra notes 84-96.
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macroeconomic growth and stability. On the other hand, the fact
that the corporation "leaks" investment opportunities because of
its fragmented capital base and inability to capture all
investment benefits means that macroeconomic growth is
sacrificed and investment transactions are foregone.
25
Externalities impose economically unjustified costs upon society
generally that also impose costs of inefficiencies and associated
macroeconomic drags. 26 Corporate governance flaws lead to a
higher-than-necessary cost of capital that is inefficient and
stunts growth while creating conditions of financial instability.
27
I will start with the corporation's strengths.
Limited liability has certainly been a success. 28 The vast
majority of productive assets in the United States are held by
publicly held corporations. 29 This is not an accident. Investors
likely have insisted upon it. Every publicly held company in the
United States enjoys limited liability.30 Any company that did
not enjoy limited liability would no doubt face a significantly
higher cost of capital. 3' Limited liability, therefore, is properly
seen as essential to a modern economy and conducive to
macroeconomic growth. 32 Any significant pull back from limited
25 See Steven A. Ramirez, Fear and Social Capitalism: The Law and
Macroeconomics of Investor Confidence, 42 WASHBURN L.J. 31, 49-50, 70-73 (2002)
(positing that public investment function is needed to implement all possible
productivity-enhancing investments).
26 I define externality to be a social or monetary cost of economic activity which
is not born by the actor. BUSINESS LAW TERMS 243 (Bryan A. Garner, ed. 1999). One
form of externality arises if corporations are given too much political power such
that they may extract various forms of government largess to the detriment of
society as a whole. President Rutherford B. Hayes recognized this problem over one
hundred years ago when he stated that the United States was "a government of
corporations, by corporations and for corporations." MICKLETHWAIT & WOOLDRIDGE,
supra note 9, at xiv.
27 See Ramirez, supra note 25, at 41-44, 59-68 (suggesting that impaired
investor confidence leads to a higher cost of capital and compromised macroeconomic
performance).
28 KRAAKMAN ET AL., supra note 6, at 8-9 ("[T]oday limited liability has become
a nearly universal feature of the corporate form. This evolution indicates strongly
the value of limited liability as a contracting tool and financing device.").
29 See WILLIAM L. CARY & MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS 243-44
(7th ed. 1995). In 1998, corporations generated ninety percent of the revenues
reported by American businesses. See MICKLETHWAIT & WOOLDRIDGE, supra note 9,
at 200 n.11.
30 Indeed, "almost all large-scale business firms adopt a legal form" that
includes limited liability. KRAAKMAN ET AL., supra note 6, at 1.
31 See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 14, at 331-32.
32 See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Rise of Dispersed Ownership: The Roles of Law
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liability would impose severe macroeconomic costs as investors
would shun public capital investments, thereby driving the cost
of capital higher.3 3 Thus, regardless of the efficiency of limited
liability, it is fundamental to the macroeconomic performance of
modern industrial society. 34 In any event, it is difficult to see the
efficiency in imposing costs upon shareholders who do not
exercise control over the activities generating the costs.3 5
Similarly, it is difficult to quarrel with the legal innovations
of the nineteenth century-fundamental to the history of the
corporation-which allowed capital to be committed to business
enterprises free of the disruptive claims of shareowners and their
creditors. 36 One may think of this element of a corporation as a
dimension of legal personality, but, in any event, the effect is to
shield the assets of the corporation from the creditors of
shareholders. 37 These claims were effectively transferred to the
value of the shares themselves and the cash flows associated
with those shares.38 This bit of legal hocus-pocus meant real
benefits in terms of giving business enterprises an infinite
investment horizon and the certainty of committed capital. 39 The
law thus eliminated unnecessary risks that had previously
plagued the capital formation process.40
and the State in the Separation of Ownership and Control, 111 YALE L.J. 1, 5 (2001)("A growing body of research suggests that an active securities market is an engine
for economic growth.").
33 See MICKLETHWAIT & WOOLDRIDGE, supra note 9, at 45 ("Unlimited liability
restricted a firm's ability to raise capital.").
34 Many commentators suggest that as a default contract provision, limited
liability lowers the cost of capital, but that it may not be economically desirable in a
tort context. See KRAAVAN ET AL., supra note 6, at 8-10, 74-75.
35 See Mendelson, supra note 9, at 1301-03 (asserting that efficiency arguments
in favor of limited liability are strongest "in the case of the individual shareholder
that holds a small percentage of stock").
36 Blair, supra note 7, at 454-56. Corporations meant that "[i]nvestments could
be made in long-lived and specialized physical assets, in information and control
systems, in specialized knowledge and routines, and in reputation and relationships,
all of which could be sustained even as individual participants in the enterprise
came and went." Id.
37 See KRAAKMAN ET AL., supra note 6, at 7 (identifying a rule of liquidation
providing that the "personal creditors of an individual owner" cannot "foreclose on
the owner's share of firm assets").
38 Id. at 7-8.
39 See id. (explaining that "strong form" legal personality, along with limited
liability, allows the free trade of shares).
40 It is noteworthy that the ability of the corporation to lock in capital must be
by operation of law as a consequence of the difficulty of negotiating with shareholder
creditors, present and future. See id. at 8.
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As tempting as it may be, caution is also warranted in
modifying the shareholder primacy value.41 Dilution of the
shareholder primacy norm is necessarily a dilution of
shareholder rights. Diluting shareholder rights, in turn, would
lead to a high cost of capital as shareholders would naturally be
unwilling to pay the same amount of money for a smaller bundle
of rights within the corporate entity. It is difficult to see how
there would be any offsetting benefits to this cost of capital
increase. Indeed, it appears that the dilution of shareholder
primacy may well be associated with corporate governance
deficiencies. 42 While some nations have emphasized a corporate
purpose beyond shareholder wealth maximization, the dominant
universal business form adheres to shareholder primacy.43 This
suggests that shareholder primacy has real value that may well
exceed any costs. 44
To some extent, my focus on a cost of capital justification has
been effectively challenged by other commentators. For example,
Professor Lynn Stout has demonstrated that arguments that
treat shareholders as owners of the corporation are difficult to
square with the actual powers of shareholders over a corporation,
including their ability to receive distribution only when decided
by directors. 45 I take issue with Professor Stout, however, on a
number of levels. First, if an individual owns all of the shares of
a corporation, there is no reason to doubt that he can operate the
firm as if he enjoys all of the emoluments of ownership. As such,
why should a fragmented ownership structure lead to a legally
cognizable diminution of those very real ownership rights?
Second, there is little evidence that labor would find the value of
control or earnings to be as high as shareholders find it to be. In
fact, the evidence seems to the contrary.46 Finally, reducing
41 See, e.g., Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919) ("A
business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the
stockholders.").
42 See generally Lynn A. Stout, Bad and Not-So-Bad Arguments for Shareholder
Primacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1189, 1200-01 (2002) (citing Mark J. Roe, The
Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm and Industrial Organization, 149 U. PA. L.
REV. 2063, 2065 (2001)).
43 See, e.g., KRAAKMAN ET AL., supra note 6, at 61-70 (discussing German and
Dutch provisions for employee representation in corporate governance).
44 See id. at 14-15, 64 (stating that deviation from shareholder primacy only
occurs "sometimes").
45 See Stout, supra note 42, at 1190-99.
46 See supra notes 41-45 and accompanying text.
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shareholder primacy neglects the fact that investors in public
corporations seem particularly ill-suited to negotiate in advance
for their rights47 yet particularly inclined toward panics when
their rights are destabilized. 48  This poses significant
macroeconomic risks.49
Nevertheless, the heart of my analysis is that granting the
shareholder primacy norm to stockholders is in accordance with
their reasonable expectations for investing, and diminishing
those rights in a legally cognizable fashion is not costless.
Indeed, the costs may well be more significant than is generally
believed. While major changes in corporate governance law have
gone largely unnoticed in capital markets, significant threats to
shareholder interests tend to result in a large loss in market
value and thereby lead to large increases in the cost of capital
that can have significant macroeconomic impact. 50
In the end, limited liability, committed enterprise capital,
and shareholder primacy clearly work in the sense that capital
markets are founded on these premises and that deep and
developed capital markets are associated around the world with
superior economic performance.51 Moreover, financial experts
and economists have demonstrated that more austere versions of
investor protection and minority shareholder rights are
associated with less effective legal regimes from an economic
perspective. 52 Therefore, it appears that these elements of the
corporation should be preserved pending evidence that
alternative models can match the largely successful results
yielded by the current legal model of the corporation. 53
This is different from suggesting that all is well with the
corporation. In fact, much ails the modern corporation. Indeed,
47 See KRAAKMAN ET AL., supra note 6, at 14 (noting that "investors are often
the most difficult to protect simply by contractual means").
48 See, e.g., Ramirez, supra note 25, at 34-35 (recounting numerous financial
panics triggered by mass shareholder exit from equity holdings).
49 Id. at 39-40.
50 Compare EISENBERG, supra note 10, at 101-07 (surveying weak evidence of
corporate law impact upon equity prices), with Ramirez, supra note 25, at 31-34(surveying the impact of crisis on investor confidence in mid-2002).
51 See Coffee, supra note 32, at 5 (noting that an active securities market is an
engine for economic growth).
52 See Rafael La Porta et al., Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1113, 1151
(1998) (postulating that nations with common-law traditions protect investors better
than countries with civil-law origins).
53 See generally KRAAKMAN ETAL., supra note 6, at 215-26.
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Professor Mitchell's book on corporate irresponsibility is a virtual
"little house of horrors" of the problems plaguing the modern
corporation. 54 I simply seek to isolate the malady beyond the
shareholder primacy norm, limited liability, and the fact that
corporate law provides enterprises with committed capital. For
the most part, I conclude that the problem with the corporation is
the lack of professional management, particularly within public
corporations, and not the essential structural elements of the
corporation.
For example, the corporation has been attacked for its
proclivity to maximize profits by ruthlessly externalizing costs.
55
Professor Mitchell has called the corporation a "perfect
externalizing machine." 56  This attack, in many respects, is an
attack on the shareholder primacy norm and limited liability.
57
Yet, as Professor Litowitz has persuasively highlighted, this
54 See MITCHELL, supra note 2, at 276 (noting that the system, although based
on democratic ideals, "has gone seriously awry").
55 See Litowitz, supra note 3, at 820, 823-24 (explaining that the single-minded
pursuit of profits leads to externalizing costs).
56 MITCHELL, supra note 2, at 49, 53.
57 See id. at 54 (stating that the combination of limited liability and shareholder
primacy is "deeply immoral" because it encourages excessive externalization).
Professor Mitchell's analysis is compelling. Nevertheless, he would agree that when
a corporation engages in tortious or unlawful conduct, there are typically at least
three sources of recovery available to victims. First, the individual wrongdoer would
be exposed to fund the losses suffered by any individual because a corporation can
only act through its agents. Second, any profits retained in the corporation as capital
free of the claims of shareholders or their creditors-which is one essential feature of
a corporation-would be available to fund such losses, regardless of whether the
profits are associated with the misconduct, so long as the mischievous employee was
acting within the scope of employment and therefore covered under the doctrine of
respondeat superior. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(1) (1956). Third,
any capital contributed to the corporation by shareholders would be available to
victims. In addition to these three sources of recovery, in certain circumstances, the
assets of shareholders could be available to plaintiffs pursuant to veil-piercing
doctrine. See, e.g., Dean Operations, Inc. v. One Seventy Assocs., 896 P.2d 1012,
1014 (Kan. 1995) (holding that corporate form may not be used to perpetuate a fraud
or injustice through the inappropriate control of shareholders). Given these sources
of recovery, it is hard to see how a corporation is any more perfect at externalizing
costs than a partnership, which can be easily dissolved years before many claims
come to fruition and lacks the ability to attract capital that public corporations have
indisputably demonstrated. Ironically, in part because of limited liability and
shareholder primacy, corporations' ability to attract capital is the very reason that
large public corporations are every plaintiffs "deep-pocket" defendant. Simply put,
corporations may well give victims more secure sources of recovery than probably
any other business form. Indeed, shareholders who exercise no control over a
corporation probably should not be liable for its torts, as imposing costs upon those
with no control over tortious conduct serves no economic rationale.
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effort to seek profits through the externalization of costs is
hardly inherent to the corporation.58  Partnerships, sole
proprietorships, and individuals will all seek to externalize costs
in the name of profit maximization. 59  Professor Litowitz also
recognizes that corporations may serve to depersonalize and
institutionalize profit-enhancing, cost-externalizing decisions
that individuals themselves may not make. 60 Still, here the
problem is not corporations per se but large institutions in
general.61 "In other words, cruelty is inversely correlated with
proximity to the victim." 62 This suggests that scholars should
largely focus on legal structures external to corporate law to
prevent excessive externalization of costs by all large
institutions. 63 Thus, the primary problem here is not corporate
law, but rather the constraints of non-corporate law and its
inadequacy in light of the size and scale of the modern public
corporation.
Similar considerations govern the issues of internalization of
mass investment benefits and governance. The problem is not
the corporate structure per se, but considerations that transcend
that structure to businesses generally and the large public
corporation in particular. The next section therefore focuses
upon potential solutions that transcend the corporation.
II. WHAT CAN LAW Do TO FIX THE "MINOR PROBLEMS" IN THE
MODERN CORPORATION?
With respect to the problem of internalization of potential
benefits from mass-investment activities that generate widely
distributed benefits, this problem is not inherent solely to the
corporation. Instead, this problem materializes in any system of
fragmented capitalization that lacks any centralized means of
58 See Litowitz, supra note 3, at 820, 823-24.
59 See id.
60 See id. at 820 (observing that the corporation's identity as an institution can
force officers to act more like machines than human beings (quoting Robert Hinkley,
Neither Enron nor Deregulation, COMMONDREAMS.ORG, May 19, 2002,
http://www.commondreams.org/views02/0519-07.htm)).
61 Id. at 840 ("The real evil lies in institutions of a certain size that can dwarf
the individual and reduce him to an agentic state of submission while distancing
him from the effects of his actions.").
62 Id. at 839.
63 KRAAKMAN ET AL., supra note 6, at 17; see also Winkler, supra note 2, at 132-
33 (arguing that non-shareholder corporate stakeholders have primarily obtained
important protections through non-corporate law).
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weighing costs and benefits from mass investment. In other
words, the problem of internalization of investment benefits is a
fundamental feature of any free market system of capitalism that
recognizes private property as the primary means of holding
wealth within a society. This problem, therefore, transcends the
legal foundation of the modern corporation. Indeed, when Adam
Smith identified the problem over 225 years ago, he did not limit
the issue to one of corporations. 64 Smith focused on the problem
of private versus public benefits-terming public benefits those
which no single private actor could capture. 65 Consequently,
Smith's prescription for the problem did not focus on corporate
law but on the role of government.
66
Smith maintained that the government should fill in the role
of investor of last resort, at least for those investment projects-
mass investment-that throw off widely diffused benefits.
67 The
problem is that after 225 years of experience, it is painfully clear
that the government is less than facile at identifying and funding
such projects. Certainly, government has occasionally stepped in
to make massive investments in projects that have proven to pay
tremendous returns, including the Interstate Highway System
and the G.I. Bill.68 These projects generated benefits that far
exceeded their costs. 69  Still, this process has neither been
institutionalized nor rationalized.
70
Today, the landscape is pocked with government investment
activity that cannot be considered justified by cost, and is
dominated by special interest influence and directed into projects
that can only be termed looney.71 For example, consider missile
defense. The threat it addresses seems contrived-we have
64 SMITH, supra note 13, at 473-74.
65 Id. at 474.
66 Id. at 468.
67 See id. at 474.
68 See Ramirez, supra note 10, at 555, 557-59 (describing the positive impact
that governmental investment projects during the New Deal had on both
employment and the economy).
69 Id. at 558 (showing that tax benefits of the G.I. Bill alone were five to twelve
times the cost to the government).
70 Id. at 555, 559 (arguing that the failure to institutionalize governmental
investment projects, such as those under the New Deal, is due in part to a failure by
lawyers to establish the necessary legal institutions to facilitate such investment).
71 See Jay Bookman, Editorial, The Legend of Missile Defense, ATLANTA J.-
CONST., Dec. 19, 2004, at 8D (likening the belief in the efficacy of missile defense
systems to believing in Santa Claus).
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
never been attacked by missiles, and any nation that permitted a
missile to be launched from its territory against the United
States would face certain annihilation.7 2 The benefits seem even
more contrived. Indeed, after numerous tests the interceptors
have significantly failed to hit simulated ballistic missiles-
unless the mock missile carries a homing beacon.7 3  The
interceptor also fails to distinguish between decoy missiles and
actual missiles.7 4 Yet, through 2004, total expenditures have
reached $130 billion with a projected $53 billion more to come
over the next five years75 and $230 billion over the next ten
years.7 6 The last two tests 77 of the interceptor rockets failed to
get off the ground at all-literally. 78  Even the Pentagon itself
has acknowledged that the program has been marred by a
trivialization of failures and an aggressive "rush to failure."79
Apparently, even if the system functioned, it could be easily
overcome .80
Given the central failure of government mass investment,81
72 Stephen M. Walt, "Rush to Failure" The Flawed Politics and Policies of
Missile Defense, HARV. MAG., May-June 2000, at 31, available athttp://128.103.1 4 2 .2 09/archive/00mj/mjOO.browser.home.html.
73 See Elizabeth Sullivan, Anti-Missile System Looks Awfully Shaky, PLAIN
DEALER (Cleveland), Feb. 24, 2005, at B9.
74 Editorial, The Data Are Garbage, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Mar. 6, 2002, at
B6.
75 Op-Ed., Starry-Eyed Wars, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Dec. 17, 2004, at 6.
76 The Data Are Garbage, supra note 74.
77 The Pentagon has apparently called the failure to launch something other
than a "test." See Editorial, 3-2-1 ... Pfft!, ST. LouIs POST-DISPATCH, Dec. 22, 2004,
at B10.
78 Sheldon Alberts, Missile Shield Fails Critical Test Again: "The Target
Launched Fine, the Interceptor Did Not", NAT'L POST (Canada), Feb. 15, 2005, at A9.
79 MISSILE DEFENSE AGENCY, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, REPORT OF THE PANELON REDUCING RISK IN BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE FLIGHT TEST PROGRAMS (WELCH
REPORT) 24 (1998), available at http://www.mda.mil/mdalink/pdf/welchrpt.pdf
80 Kim Murphy, Russia Tests Missile That Could Evade U.S. Defense, L.A.
TIMES, Feb. 19, 2004, at Al (describing how new developments in Russian strategic
missile systems could easily evade U.S. missile defense systems).81 The missile defense fiasco is just one example of many of a distorted mass
investment function in the context of the American legal system. I have previously
posited that the mass investment function had been hopelessly compromised bypolitical expediency and chaotically deployed. See Ramirez, supra note 25, at 71. To
counter this, I have proposed a depoliticized investor of last resort that could utilizegovernment investments to counter cyclical economic trends and could channel suchinvestments to their highest and best productive use. See id. at 72-74. In the course
of articulating these positions, I fully recognized the lack of political appeal forCongress to cede control over billions of government investment monies. See id. at73-74. To the extent the economic strength of the public corporation can be
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can the fragmentation of capital implicit in private property and
free markets be overcome to assure a mass investment function
that fully comprehends the total investment benefits accruing to
society from mass investment projects? Perhaps, to some extent,
it can.8 2 What is needed is elimination of legal barriers and legal
structures to encourage consortium investments.
8 3 Naturally, a
comprehensive analysis of the legal structures that could
accomplish this goal is beyond the scope of this Article.
Nevertheless, there is no reason to think that this is a less
important area of inquiry than the issue of cost externalization.
I have addressed the issue of corporate governance in depth
in another article.8 4 I have argued that corporate governance
suffers from two fatal flaws: (1) the tremendous special interest
influence that corporate managers hold over the corporate
governance regulatory environment; and (2) the distorting
impact of an antiquated system of corporate federalism.
8 5 There
can be no "race to the top" in terms of corporate governance
regimes that are economically optimized in the absence of a
depoliticized regulatory regime that reduces special interest
influence and allows an expert administrative agency to
articulate governance standards based upon the most
scientifically proven corporate governance standards,
8 6 just as a
depoliticized agency of economic experts determines monetary
harnessed to fulfill the vacuum left by a politically impaired government investment
function, perhaps corporate mass investment could leave fewer mass investment
opportunities behind.
82 There are inherent limitations to private mass investment in terms of
organizing consortia for investments which yield widely diffused benefits. For
example, some putative investors may attempt to enjoy the benefits of the
investment without bearing the costs. Similarly, some participants may be tempted
to hold out for more favorable terms. In the terminology of law and economics, these
are the familiar "free-rider" and "hold-out" problems. See JEFFERY HARRISON, LAW
AND ECONOMICS 67-68, 197 (2002). These problems are just some of the transaction
costs facing businesses that see mass investment opportunities.
83 Currently, virtually any collaboration among competitors triggers antitrust
scrutiny. See FED. TRADE COMM'N & U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES
FOR COLLABORATIONS AMONG COMPETITORS 2 (2000), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/04/ftcdojguidelines.pdf ('"These Guidelines describe an
analytical framework to assist businesses in assessing the likelihood of an antitrust
challenge to a collaboration with one or more competitors.").
84 Steven A. Ramirez, The End of Corporate Governance Law: Optimizing Legal
Structures to Secure a Race to the Top (unpublished working paper, on file with
author).
85 Id.
86 Id.
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policy in the United States.8 7 This leaves us hobbled with a
system of corporate governance that is subject to periodic specialinterest raids resulting in a "race to the bottom."88 My proposed
remedy is a depoliticized corporate governance authority with the
ability to articulate optimized corporate governance norms based
upon empirical analysis.8 9
These structural problems are manifest in the precise terms
of corporate governance that prevail in the United States today.
For example, "directors are selected by management and not
elected by shareholders."90 While there was an initiative to
reform the federal proxy rules to give shareholders a real
opportunity to have a voice in director selection, managers were
able to use their special interest influence to preclude this
reform.91
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Enron scandals seem tohave had little impact upon executive compensation. 92 Indeed,
the long-term trend has been termed "troublesome" by key
regulators and lawmakers; in 1993, executive compensation at
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 Id.; see also Steven A. Ramirez, Depoliticizing Financial Regulation, 41 WM.& MARY L. REV. 503, 560-63, 570-74 (2000) (arguing that political influence, such as
well-funded lobbying efforts, has been the primary cause of weakening constraints
on corporate managers).
90 Ramirez, Flaw in Reform, supra note 23, 856-57; see also Joo, supra note 24,at 742-47 (stating that on corporate boards "[h]omogeneity [blegets [hlomogeneity").91 The SEC proposed expanding shareholder franchise rights in the wake of theEnron scandals. The status of this reform initiative was well stated in a story about
the legacy of SEC Chair William Donaldson:
Other initiatives are still vulnerable to concerted business lobbying--or
simple neglect. Take the chairman's push to give shareholders an easierprocess to replace errant directors-a vital concern to both individual andinstitutional investors seeking better corporate governance. The BusinessRoundtable, representing Corporate America's top CEOs, foughtDonaldson's proposals vigorously. The SEC's plan was diluted to the pointthat dissidents would have to persuade a majority of shareholders to
withhold their votes-and would still have to run a two-year-long gauntlet
to get their own candidate onto a proxy ballot. The agency hasn't yet passedthat measure, and a new chairman would probably shelve the effort rather
than expend precious political capital.Amy Borrus & Mike McNamee with Emily Thornton, A Legacy That May Not Last,
BUS. WK., June 13, 2005, at 38.
92 Rep. Frank Welcomes Securities Regulators' Comments on Runaway ExecutiveCompensation, U.S. FED. NEWS, Apr. 21, 2005 (reporting that followingimplementation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the issue of executive compensation was
raised at a Financial Services Committee hearing).
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public companies totaled 4.8% of profits, and, by 2003,
compensation totaled more than 10%.93  In 2004, executive
compensation increased by 25% while stock prices and wages for
other workers stagnated. 94 Shareholder primacy is supposed to
ensure that shareholders control corporations and that profits of
the corporation inure to the primary benefit of the
shareholders. 95 It is increasingly clear, however, that the balance
on both of these fronts is tipping more than ever in favor of
management, and is in fact approaching a CEO primacy model.
Management has used its political power, backed by the
corporate wealth with which it is entrusted to systematically tilt
corporate governance in its favor. 96  This special interest
influence must be quelled through the creation of a more
depoliticized regulatory framework.
An additional means for creating a more optimal
internalization of costs and benefits, as well as securing superior
corporate governance, is to professionalize America's corps of
senior officers and directors, akin to the effort to professionalize
the securities brokerage industry.97  Like the securities
brokerage business, there is a macroeconomic basis for imposing
a federal professionalization regime for directors and officers of
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 See KRAAKMAN ET AL., supra note 6, at 13 ("[Iun an investor-owned firm, both
the right to participate in control-which generally involves voting in the election 
of
directors and voting to approve major transactions-and the right to receive the
firm's residual earnings, or profits, are typically proportional to the amount 
of
capital contributed to the firm.").
96 Ramirez, supra note 89, at 572 ("The most distinctive aspect of the last
decade in corporate law was the celerity with which traditional constraints 
on
corporate managers weakened."(citing Joel Seligman, The Case for Federal
Minimum Corporate Law Standards, 49 MD. L. REV. 947, 949 (1990))). Professor
Seligman wrote this before the enactment of the most promiscuous weakening 
of
constraints on corporate management, the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
("PSLRA") of 1995 which significantly insulated corporate managers from liability
through private actions pursuant to the federal securities laws. See Steven 
A.
Ramirez, Arbitration and Reform in Private Securities Litigation: Dealing with the
Meritorious as Well as the Frivolous, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1055, 1093 (1999)
[hereinafter Ramirez, Arbitration and Reform]. "[T]he PSLRA merely rigs private
securities claims so that defendants almost always win" risking "the long 
term
stability of our securities markets." Id.
97 Beginning in the 1930s and continuing to the present day, federal law has
operated to impose a comprehensive system of professionalization of the securities
brokerage industry. See Ramirez, supra note 17, at 532 (showing that the federal
securities laws operate to protect investors from the professional misconduct 
of
broker-dealers).
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publicly held corporations. 98  Specifically, a loss of investor
confidence in the integrity of corporate governance and
transparency can threaten macroeconomic performance and
stability. 99 As such, the senior officers and directors of ourpublicly held corporations wield tremendous economic power in
ways that impact more than the narrow interests of the
corporations they captain.100 This economic power pervades
virtually all aspects of the lives of our citizens, from employment
to health care to retirement to environmental hazards. 101
Given the very broad definitions of professionals in other
contexts, from lawyers to doctors to hairdressers,102 it is easy tothink of senior officers and directors as meeting the definition of
a professional. 103 Professionals typically owe non-waivable,
extra-contractual duties to their clients.104 Professional
relationships are generally imbued with a high degree of publicinterest-either in protecting the client, as in an attorney-client
relationship, or for federal professional standards to protectinvestor confidence and macroeconomic performance, as in the
securities broker-client relationship.105 The professional
relationship between managers and the publicly held corporation
is at least as important to the economy as the broker-client
98 See id.
99 See Ramirez, supra note 25, at 31-35.100 1 have long argued that special interest influence has compromised corporate
governance for at least the past few decades. See Ramirez, supra note 89, at 575("For many decades politics had foiled financial institution regulatory reform.").
101 See CHARLES DERBER, CORPORATION NATION: How CORPORATIONS ARETAKING OVER OUR LIVES AND WHAT WE CAN Do ABOUT IT 1, 87-88, 305 (2d ed.2001) (detailing feelings of employee "powerlessness" created by corporations, thepharmaceutical industry's influence over healthcare, and corporate spending todefeat environmental initiatives).
102 See Pratt v. E. W. Edwards & Son, 227 A.D. 210, 212, 237 N.Y.S. 372, 374(4th Dep't 1929) (holding that by soliciting patronage, a beauty shop operator
assures the public that he or she has the requisite skill and knowledge to dischargethe occupation); see also W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS185 (5th ed. 1984) (listing occupations held to the professional standard of careincluding pharmacists, pilots, nurses, karate teachers, veterinarians, travel agents,
skiers, construction inspectors, and doctors).103 See Ira M. Millstein, The Professional Board, 50 BUS. LAW. 1427, 1440 (1995)(proposing a modest version of professionalization for directors only).104 In the context of broker-dealer regulation, this duty requires that customers
always be treated in accordance with "ust and equitable principles of trade."'Ramirez, Arbitration and Reform, supra note 96, at 1129 (quoting 15 U.S.C. §78f(b)(5) (2000)).
105 See Ramirez, supra note 17, at 528.
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relationship.1 0 6  Moreover, shareholders are as much at
informational disadvantages as are clients of lawyers or patients
of doctors. 10 7 There is also reason to believe that serving as a
senior officer or director of a public corporation is ever more
complex and requires specialized training. 08 For example, after
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,109 it is clear that many members
of the board are going to require increasing legal expertise and
accounting facility." 0 The time is past where individuals without
specialized training can serve at such lofty positions without
serving in a professionally competent capacity."' All things
considered, it is difficult to articulate any reason why managers
106 Indeed, it was a failure of corporate governance and not a failure of the
brokerage industry that led to the meltdown in investor confidence in 2002. See
Ramirez, supra note 25, at 31-32.
107 Ira Millstein has stated the reality of enhanced need for professionalism at
the corporate board level in terms of information required for directors to monitor
management, as well as the increased need for sophistication among directors:
In our free market system, the board of directors is the oversight
mechanism charged with monitoring management and providing
accountability to shareholders, while allowing managers the freedom they
need to run the business. While, historically, the U.S. board tended to
passivity, in the past decade, boards have become more independent and
active, and real oversight has increased. Ideally, meaningful monitoring is
aimed at detecting and responding to performance problems before they
develop into crises. To do so requires that the board's role expand beyond
hiring and removing managers after long-term failure, their traditional
form of activation, into more substantive areas, including participation in
strategic planning (with performance monitoring vis-d-vis the corporate
plan) and creation of incentives linked to corporate performance. This
expansion of the board's role increases the demands on directors' time, on
their need for information about and education in the business, and on
their level of "professionalism."
Millstein, supra note 103, at 1428.
108 See id.
109 15 U.S.C. 7201 (Supp. II 2004).
110 Among the requirements of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act ("SOX") applicable to
board directors are: (1) each publicly held company is required to have a financial
expert on its audit committee or explain why there is no such expert; (2) the audit
committee must supervise the corporation's auditor in a detailed fashion; and (3) the
audit committee is to be independent of management. In addition, SOX creates
incentives for an independent Qualified Legal Compliance Committee to screen
reports of possible violations of law or regulations. See generally Subcommittee on
the Annual Review, Annual Review of Federal Securities Regulation, 58 BUS. LAW.
747, 749-50 (2003) (indicating that directors will have more responsibilities and,
therefore, need broader expertise).
11 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 299A (1965) ("[Olne who undertakes
to render services in the practice of a profession or trade is required to exercise the
skill and knowledge normally possessed by members of that profession or
trade .... ").
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of publicly held companies should not have to endure some kind
of qualification exam and bear professional obligations.
Recently, Congress federalized the accounting profession,
specifically auditors of public corporations, for the sake of
rescuing investor confidence and protecting the macro-
economy.11 2 This effort to federalize the auditing profession has
its roots in the spectacular accounting scandals of 2001-2002,
including Enron, WorldCom, and a host of others.llS Although
many of these scandals could be blamed upon an errant
accounting industry, the accountants were hostage to the
"infectious greed" originating in the CEO's suite and the
boardroom, not the other way around. 14 Consequently, thejustification for federal intervention seems stronger for corporate
managers than for auditors.115 While it is true that Sarbanes-
Oxley and related "reform" initiatives did revamp much of the
role of the board of directors, federal law has never operated to
mandate professional obligations for corporate managers as it
now has for both accountants and securities brokers.116 This
112 See 15 U.S.C. § 7211 (Supp. II 2004) (mandating the creation of the Public
Company Accounting Oversight Board ("PCAOB") to supervise auditors of publiclytraded corporations). Notably, the PCAOB is a self-funded agency that is free of the
congressional appropriations process. Id. § 7219. Nevertheless, it is subject to theplenary power of the SEC over virtually all aspects of its affairs. Id. § 7217. It is still
an open question whether the PCAOB will be sufficiently resistant to specialinterest influence. See Ramirez, supra note 25, at 64; see also Joel Seligman,Cautious Evolution or Perennial Irresolution: Stock Market Self-Regulation During
the First Seventy Years of the Securities and Exchange Commission, 59 Bus. LAW.1347, 1348-49 (2004) (comparing the structure of the PCAOB to the federal self-
regulatory structure for securities broker-dealers).
n3 See Ramirez, supra note 25, at 31-32, 63-64.
114 Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Fed. Reserve Bd., Semiannual Monetary Policy
Report to the Congress Before the Committee on Banking, Housing, and UrbanAffairs, U.S. Senate (July 16, 2002), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/
boarddocslhh/2002/July/testimony.htm (stating that "infectious greed" within thebusiness community overwhelmed the "guardians of financial information" as "[t]oo
many" corporate executives sought to "harvest" illicit gains).
115 This fact has not been lost on the auditing industry. See generally DouglasGuerrero, The Root of Corporate Evil, INTERNAL AUDITOR, Dec. 2004, at 37. Guerrero
cites a study undertaken by the Conference Board-an organization of businessleaders dedicated to helping the corporate sector perform better-that found that the
corporate crises of 2001-2002 had their causes in a short term focus by managementin pursuit of "excessive compensation." Id. at 38. Guerrero concludes that "executive
compensation issues ... [were] not addressed at all by Sarbanes-Oxley" and thattherefore future frauds are likely as corporate executives are not likely to "self-
regulate." Id. at 40.
i16 In general, the reforms wrought by SOX regarding corporate governancefocus upon the audit function and the audit committee. Thus, public companies must
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seems anomalous given the power of managers of public
corporations and the manifest breakdown of state-law regulatory
systems to appropriately control manager malfeasance.
117
Therefore, I propose a comprehensive scheme of
professionalization for senior officers and directors of public
corporations-complete with examinations, professional norms
and discipline, continuing education, and professional liability.
Inherent in the concept of professional obligations is the
concept of training and qualification in order to assure the
competency of those serving as directors or officers of publicly
held corporations. In the securities brokerage industry,
representatives must pass a qualification examination before
they can do business with the public. 18  These standards and
examinations are administered by the industry itself pursuant to
a self-regulatory regime imposed by Congress and supervised
under the plenary authority of the Securities Exchange
Commission ("SEC").119 In other words, the brokerage industry
itself sets brokerage industry standards.120 Although there are
constraints upon the industry's ability to promulgate
promiscuous professional standards, perhaps the most significant
is the economic self-interest of the industry itself.'
2
' I have
have a financial expert on the audit committee (or explain why they do not have
such an expert), the audit committee must meet certain independence requirements,
the audit committee must essentially supervise the firm's auditor, and the auditor is
restricted in providing non-audit services to the firm. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 7231, 78j-1. A
further reform mandates that CEOs and CFOs certify financial statements. Id. §
7241. Finally, executives are required to give back certain incentive compensation
when there is a restatement of earnings necessary due to material noncompliance.
Id. § 7243.
117 See, e.g., supra note 24 and accompanying text.
118 Ramirez, supra note 17, at 541.
119 See id. at 540-42. Congress provided for the registration and regulation of
statutorily defined self-regulatory organizations ("SROs"). These SROs must register
with the SEC and adhere to certain statutorily defined supervisory responsibilities.
Each broker-dealer, and each representative of a broker-dealer, must in turn
register with at least one SRO. The most notable SROs, in terms of public profile,
are the New York Stock Exchange ("NYSE") and the National Association of
Securities Dealers ("NASD"). See id. at 540-43.
120 See id. at 542. Each SRO is governed by its membership, which is comprised
of the broker-dealers registered with that SRO. Id. at 542.
121 The SEC has the power to "abrogate, add to, and delete from" any SRO rule.
15 U.S.C. § 78s(c). In addition, the SEC may enforce SRO rules. See id. § 78u(d)(1).
The SEC is also empowered to sanction SROs that fail in their supervisory role. See
Ramirez, supra note 17, at 542-43, 543 n.99. The SEC reviews any SRO sanction de
novo. See 15 U.S.C. § 78s(e)(1).
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argued that professionalism in the securities industry has over
time enhanced the market niche occupied by securities broker-
dealers.122 This should come as no surprise to those familiar with
economic inefficiencies imposed by agency costs. Typically, legal
infrastructure that serves to minimize agency costs implicit in all
agency-principal relationships also serves to enhance market
outcomes for both agent and principal.123 "In general, reducing
agency costs is in the interests of all parties to a transaction,
principals and agents alike."124 When a principal faces reduced
transaction costs, like agency costs, he is willing to pay more for
the agent's services. 125  Thus, professionalizing corporate
governance for public companies is likely to be both economically
efficient, as well as macroeconomically beneficial, as it enhances
investor confidence thereby reducing panics and lowering the
cost of capital. 26
Another important dimension of professional competency is
the duty of care. 127 The duty of care had never really operated to
generate much liability of directors of public corporations.128
Other than cases involving financial institutions, it is difficult tofind cases where directors or senior officers have been held liable
for breaches of the duty of care. I have argued that the most
famous duty of care case which actually held outside directors
liable, Smith v. Van Gorkom,129 had little to do with the directors'
duty of care and everything to do with the professional
responsibility of attorneys.130 In any event, professionalizing the
securities industry may only marginally expand director liability,
as that liability would be measured by the standards of the
industry and would turn in the end on the testimony of
122 See Ramirez, supra note 17, at 566.
123 See KRAAKMAN ET AL., supra note 6, at 22.
124 Id.
125 See id.
126 This has been the experience in the securities brokerage industry. See
Ramirez, supra note 17, at 559-64.
127 See id. at 557 (explaining how a duty of care obligates professionals to
"exercise a professional standard of care" when they "implicitly warrant that they
will exercise the degree of skill and judgment that can reasonably be expected from
similarly situated professionals").
128 See Joseph W. Bishop, Jr., Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks: New Trends inthe Indemnification of Corporate Directors and Officers, 77 YALE L.J. 1078, 1094-95(1968).
129 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
130 See Steven Ramirez, The Chaos of Smith, 45 WASHBURN L.J. (forthcoming
2005).
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experts. 131  Thus, the directors' industry itself would define
liability to a very large degree. 132 Moreover, this prospective
definition of duty of care obligations, pursuant to more detailed
professional standards, would avoid the uncertainty and risks
inherent in fiduciary duty adjudications that in the end turn
upon ad hoc factual findings. 133  Perhaps, after centuries of
struggle, a professional duty of care for senior managers and
directors of public corporations would get this issue just about
right. 134
This is particularly so if a regulated self-regulatory regime
similar to that in the securities industry were imposed.13 5 A
broad code of ethics, that transcended mandatory law, could
impose expertly promulgated standards that could provide
detailed guidance to professional managers on a prospective
basis.1 36 In addition, this code could be enforced, as are many
such professional codes, without regard to whether misconduct
caused losses and through sanctions that do not run afoul of
131 Professional liability typically requires expert testimony. See Cross v.
Huttenlocher, 440 A.2d 952, 954 (Conn. 1981) ("To prevail in a malpractice case the
plaintiff must establish through expert testimony both the standard of care and the
fact that the defendant's conduct did not measure up to that standard."); see also
Boyle v. Welsh, 589 N.W.2d 118, 124 (Neb. 1999) (requiring expert testimony in an
attorney malpractice case); Wessel v. Erickson Landscaping Co., 711 P.2d 250, 253
(Utah 1985) (holding that a structural engineer could establish the standards
applicable to landscapers in building a retaining wall).
132 See McCann v. Davis, Malm & D'Agostine, 669 N.E.2d 1077, 1078 (Mass.
1996) (explaining how violation of professional standards is evidence that may
support a jury finding of negligence).
133 I have previously argued that actions for breach of fiduciary duty, anchored
in more amorphous equitable principles, may inject unnecessary risk and
uncertainty into professional relationships. See Ramirez, supra note 17, at 550-53.
Under traditional tort concepts, professional standards define negligence except in
egregious circumstances. See, e.g., Helling v. Carey, 519 P.2d 981, 983 (Wash. 1974)
(holding a physician liable for malpractice, notwithstanding compliance with
professional standards, for failure to administer low cost glaucoma test).
134 One example of the depths of the problems with our system of corporate
governance is the recent scandal at Refco Group Ltd., the largest futures broker in
the United States. The CEO of Refco successfully hid $430 million dollars in debt to
a company he controlled. The company went public in the late summer of 2005, and
was bankrupt just a few months later. This all occurred after the SOX reforms, and
has served to put all investors on notice that they must conduct their own thorough
due diligence before buying securities in the U.S. capital market. Ramirez, supra
note 130, at nn. 128-38. Of course, this asks the impossible.
135 See Ramirez, supra note 17, at 542-48 (summarizing professional standards
prevailing in securities brokerage industry).
136 See id. at 543-44.
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traditional concerns about disproportionate liability. 137 In the
securities brokerage industry, sanctions include suspension,
censure, fines, or a permanent bar from the industry. 138 All of
this could be administered without expanding the federal
bureaucracy through the authority of a self-regulatory
organization supervised by the SEC as is the case in the
brokerage industry. 139 In short, a professional code of ethics
could help prevent future Enron scandals without generally
burdening those corporations that already adhere to sound
principles of corporate governance. 140
There is more to being a professional, however, than
competency. Professionals are not permitted to simply enter into
arm's-length transactions that benefit themselves at the expense
of the client. 141  Professionals face the prospect of career
termination for failing to adhere to professional standards of
conduct. 142 In addition, professionals must be abreast of, and
guided by, the best learning extant. 143 In the corporate context,
this entails a thorough understanding of the externalization
problem, the internalization problem, and the manner in which
these problems interact with governance activity to make the
corporation too often a vessel for destructive mischief. Professor
Litowitz has stated the need here well: "In the end, the problem
137 Traditionally, directorships have been associated with excessive liability
exposure. See Roberta Romano, Corporate Governance in the Aftermath of the
Insurance Crisis, 39 EMORY L.J. 1155, 1160-61 (1990) (describing how individuals
began either not to accept board positions or resign from boards in order to avoid
liability).
138 Ramirez, supra note 17, at 541.
139 See id. at 535-36 (describing the policy basis for the self-regulatory regime in
the securities brokerage industry).
140 One problem with government regulations is the increased cost to public
companies. For example, SOX has reportedly increased the cost of being a public
company by at least 130%. Adrian Michaels, The Downside To Staying Public, FIN.
TIMES (London), June 4, 2004, at 10. Thus, a number of companies appear to have
exited the public securities markets. See id. It is notable that all companies subject
to SOX bear these costs regardless of whether they suffered the kind of scandals and
governance meltdowns associated with Enron and WorldCom. See id. (discussing
how SOX caused all public companies to pay more in legal fees, audits, directors'
compensation, and insurance).
141 In the securities industry, professionals must adhere to "'just and equitable
principles of trade."' See Ramirez, supra note 17, at 528 (quoting 15 U.S.C. §
78f(b)(5) (2000)).
142 Id. at 541.
143 Id. at 537-38.
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with corporate law is that it lacks fail-safe mechanisms .... "144 1
posit that a regime of professional self-regulation, supervised by
an expert regulatory agency, would be such a fail-safe device.
The ability for business to exploit the proven value of the
corporation is a powerful economic privilege which in the end
exists and is embedded in law to serve the economic needs of
society. 145 Too often it fails even on its own economic terms, and
this stark reality is simply beyond cavil. 146 Requiring these
privileges to be exercised under professional stewardship,
complete with a tutored understanding of both the strengths and
blind spots of the modern public corporation, is the least that
society should insist upon to secure the corporation's economic
benefits.1 47  Indeed, one nearly magical element of
professionalization is that in the long run it tends to serve the
commercial interests not only of the client, but also of the
professionals themselves, while at the same time securing
important public policy goals.1 48
The next part of this Article seeks to exit the realm of
abstraction and enter the realm of application. I chose race to be
the testing ground of this idea of professionalization as a means
of illustrating its potential, specifically because I believe race is a
144 Litowitz, supra note 3, at 830.
145 See KRAAKMAN ET AL., supra note 6, at 18 (positing that because the
corporation exists as a matter of law, it should serve the overall interests of society).
146 Mitchell has noted how corporations have not catered to the interests of
society:
[T]he business corporation has also been a subject of horror. Horror for the
way its limited liability permits it to dump the costs of production
onto ... victims of environmental pollution, consumers of dangerous and
poorly made products, and workers whose wages have... in real terms,
dropped. Horror as continuing massive layoffs treat workers.. . as little
more than disposable chattel ....
MITCHELL, supra note 2, at 1.
147 Imbuing individuals with a grander vision of their environment is central to
professionalism. At the heart of professionalism is the tragedy of the "commons"
problem. When one broker uses his position to line his own pockets at the expense of
a client, it harms the collective reputation of all brokers. Federalization of the
remedy of professionalism seems to occur when macroeconomic considerations
exacerbate this problem of the commons. In other words, when the brokerage
industry sacrifices its collective reputation in the name of immediate enrichment, it
raises the cost of capital across the economy. See Ramirez, supra note 10, at 535-36
(suggesting that the professionalization of the securities brokerage industry was
intended to restore investor confidence and address macroeconomic growth and
stability challenges posed by the Great Depression).
148 See Ramirez, supra note 89, at 565-66.
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central economic problem of our age. 149
III. RACE AND THE MODERN CORPORATION
Race is a compelling problem in America today, exacting
catastrophic macroeconomic costs. 150 Although economists have
not recently quantified these costs, I have estimated that race
exacts a toll of $1 trillion per year. 51 I also maintain that race
problems are inextricably linked to economics: "The very concept
of race amounts to the wanton and pervasive destruction of
human capital."' 52  Moreover, if race is centrally an economic
problem, then the modern corporation, as our central economic
institution, must play a role. Indeed, the largest five hundred
corporations in America control over seventy-five percent of our
nation's most productive assets; 153 those assets are almost
exclusively under the control of white males who have powerful
incentives to continue to perpetuate a racially monolithic power
structure. 154
Nevertheless, a corporate legal structure-broadly defined to
include the fundamental parts of the definition of the
corporation, as well as the environment in which it operates-
requires the perfect internalization of costs and benefits, as well
as the optimization of corporate governance. This would
maximize the economic performance of the institution as well as
serve to reduce drastically the costs of race in America. For
example, if race inflicts costs of $1 trillion on our economy
annually, then it would significantly benefit corporate America to
eliminate the destruction of human capital that is central to
race.1 55 This suggests that investment consortia consisting of
149 See generally Steven A. Ramirez, What We Teach When We Teach About
Race: The Problem of Law and Pseudo-Economics, 54 J. LEGAL EDUC. 365, 374-75(2004). Given the huge costs of race in America and the centrality of the modern
corporation to our economic system, race is the perfect field for the study of any
proposed restructuring in corporate law.
150 Id.
151 Id. at 375.
152 Steven A. Ramirez, Bearing the Costs of Racial Inequality: Brown and the
Myth of the Equality/Efficiency Trade-Off, 44 WASHBURN L.J. 87, 88 (2004).
153 Ramirez, Flaw in Reform, supra note 23, at 837.
154 Ninety-five percent of all board seats are held by whites and ninety percent
of all senior officers of Fortune 1000 companies are white males. See Ramirez, Flaw
in Reform, supra note 23, at 838.
155 The analysis of the cost of race has its roots in two sources: first, the
inadequate exploitation of the current stock of human capital within the African-
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major corporate sponsors could conceivably privatize the mass
investment function envisaged by Adam Smith some 225 years
ago, in a fashion consistent with profit maximization. 156 The
devastation of human capital implicit in race could conceivably
be stemmed through a massive recapitalization of previously
marginalized communities. The facilitation of such investment
consortia basically operates to allow a broader capture of the
benefits of this kind of mass investment initiative. 157 Indeed, it
may well be that the pursuit of a program of reparations could be
profitably pursued by a consortia of corporations that in the past
have profited from sordid racial policies.
158
Similarly, race in America has always operated in a manner
that indulged an individual's need for domination, exploitation,
and subjugation at the expense of a victim's ability to be a fully
contributing member of society.159 In other words, racial
American community; and second, inadequate human capital development within
the African-American community. Ramirez, supra note 149, at 372 (citing Andrew F.
Brimmer, The Economic Cost of Discrimination Against Black Americans, in
ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES ON AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 11, 11 (Margaret C. Simms ed.,
1995)). These costs lead to compromised earnings within the African-American labor
pool. It should be noted, however, that these costs extend beyond the African-
American community. Virtually every producer suffers losses from the depleted
economic actualization of the African-American community to the extent that
diminished buying power impairs the ability of entrepreneurs to bring innovative
products to market. Virtually every employer is faced with higher labor costs
because of the underdeveloped human capital within the African-American
population and because of the underexploited stock of human capital in this
community.
156 I have recently argued that massive recapitalization of human capital within
communities of color is essential to resolve race and is macroeconomically beneficial
to our society. See Ramirez, supra note 84.
157 See generally Ramirez, supra note 152, at 100-04 (demonstrating the high
likelihood that investments in human capital pay benefits exceeding their costs).
158 This proposal is akin to a recent effort to show that reparations can be
largely privatized. The difference is that I posit that human capital recovery
programs, human capital recapitalization, and community redevelopment need not
be exclusively "charitable" but can be founded upon profitable investments by
consortia of corporations that are positioned to harvest the economic benefits from
such efforts. Thus, large corporations with economic potential in Detroit, Michigan
may band together to strengthen the quality of labor pools and buying power in that
community. See Saul Levmore, Privatizing Reparations, 84 B.U. L. REV. 1291, 1307-
08 (2004).
159 Of course, the underlying dynamics of race transcend economic rationality.
See Richard H. McAdams, Cooperation and Conflict: The Economics of Group Status
Production and Race Discrimination, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1003, 1084 (1995) ("I have
argued for a sober appreciation that solidarity for some often means enmity for
others."). See generally Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Roadmap: Is the Marketplace
Theory for Eradicating Discrimination a Blind Alley?, 93 Nw. U. L. REV. 215 (1998)
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oppression results in externalities. In the corporate context this
means indulging racial mythology at the expense of rational
hiring decisions, or using race strategically to achieve higher
levels of compensation. 160 Of course, it also means massive
distortions in our system of developing and harnessing our
nation's human capital because of the central role of the
corporation in our economy. 161 Public corporations have always
been governed by the white male elite; they were so governed in
1954 when America finally started to turn its back on apartheid,
and they are so governed today. 162 As I have demonstrated
previously, this reality appears powerfully related to the
economic destruction implicit in race and issues relating to a
system of corporate governance that facilitates homosocial
reproduction as a means of entrenching the power of governing
white elites. 163 More specifically, the reason that human capital
is depleted today in racialized communities is the direct result of
the point of racialization-the pervasive and wanton destruction
of human capital as a means of subordination.164 The reason the
bastions of power are dominated by an exclusive elite of white
males is because CEOs who select members of this cadre have
powerful incentives to engage in homosocial reproduction-it
enhances their power and their compensation.' 65 In other words,
these racial problems are rooted in the fragmented capital
(book review) (suggesting that discrimination is an extra-economic phenomenon that
is rooted in human need for domination).
160 Ramirez, supra note 18, at 1590-91.
161 This distortion is in addition to the already prodigious distortions plaguing
human capital formation in the United States as a result of race. See Ramirez, supra
note 149, at 366-72.
162 See ZWEIGENHAFT & DOMHOFF, supra note 21, at vii, 4, 6-7, 177.
163 Token diversity alone seems unlikely to disrupt the apartheid system of
corporate governance prevailing in the United States. See id. at 176-94(demonstrating that even diverse members of the power elite must demonstrate
adherence to the norms of the dominant group). A true embrace of diversity,
however, does seem to alter the prevailing pattern of corporate governance. See
Ramirez, Flaw in Reform, supra note 23, at 845-56 (examining the possible positive
effects of diversifying American corporate boards). Professionalism would seemingly
reinforce this movement from a CEO-dominated board to a more diverse and less
obsequious board.
164 Ramirez, supra note 149, at 375.
165 See Ramirez, supra note 18, at 1589-90 (citing James D. Westphal &
Edward J. Zajac, Who Shall Govern? CEO/Board Power, Demographic Similarity,
and New Director Selection, 40 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 60, 77, 79 (1995) (showing that
powerful CEOs pick demographically similar directors and achieve higher
compensation)).
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structure inherent in private property-implying a distorted
mass investment function-and flawed corporate governance.
Nor are the effects of this homosocial reproduction limited to
the commanding heights of corporate America. I have shown
previously that diversity at virtually all levels of the corporation
enhances financial performance. 166 In fact, this is now such
mainstream management science that the Harvard Business
Review recently published a case study of the results of diversity
initiatives at IBM and its successful measurement of those
results.167 But diversity programs are not likely to succeed
without strong senior level support. 168 Managers engaging in
homosocial reproduction do not provide strong leadership
sufficient to support the success of diversity within their
corporations. 6 9 Thus, once it takes hold in the boardroom,
homosocial reproduction is likely to take root throughout the
corporation to distort hiring and advancement.
Professionalization is not likely to fully remedy all of these
shortcomings in the law surrounding the modern corporation.
170
Nevertheless, tutoring senior officers and directors in concepts of
broad professional responsibility and the role of the corporate
privilege in our society is likely to result in a greater appreciation
of the stewardship extended to the captains of industry. Lawyers
and stockbrokers still commit malpractice and engage in
unethical behavior at the expense of their clients, 171 yet there is
little doubt that the self-regulatory policing encourages a
166 See Ramirez, Diversity, supra note 23, at 90-109 (showing that diversity in
corporate America produces various positive effects on business, creating a more
innovative business environment which eventually sparks productivity and overall
performance).
167 See generally David A. Thomas, Diversity as Strategy, HARv. Bus. REV., Sept.
2004, at 98 (demonstrating significant improvement in both productivity and
performance after diversity initiatives were undertaken).
168 Ramirez, Diversity, supra note 23, at 111.
169 See id. (noting the pronouncement of the Labor Department's Glass Ceiling
Commission that "change must come from the top" for corporate diversity initiatives
to exist and succeed).
170 For example, no amount of professionalization will eliminate the problem of
externalities if there are flaws in the non-corporate law that encourages
externalizing costs. See KRAAKMAN ET AL., supra note 6, at 17 (observing that "many
constraints [are] imposed on companies by bodies of law designed to serve objectives
that are largely unrelated to the core characteristics of the corporate form").
171 Indeed, much of the articulation of professional standards in the securities
brokerage industry is the result of SRO or SEC adjudication of putative violations of
professional norms. See Ramirez, supra note 17, at 542-48.
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superior professional culture in terms of competency, loyalty, and
diligence. 172 With respect to the securities industry, it is clear
that the professionalization of the industry-at least when
supervised by the SEC-has eliminated many excesses. 173 With
respect to attorneys, the relatively frequent disbarment of errant
professionals certainly creates an incentive for other lawyers to
put their clients ahead of their narrow, short-term self-
interest.174 Thus, professionalization of the management of the
publicly held corporation should lead to more adept business
leadership with greater fidelity to shareholders and to society in
general. 175 If professionalization can help optimize the conduct of
corporate operations, then one would expect that some marginal
resolution of the problem of race in America would naturally
follow.
Professionalizing the management of the public corporation
has other advantages. At the root of much corporate dysfunction
is the "club" atmosphere at the top of corporate America. 176
Professionalism should replace this culture with one of
172 See, e.g., William T. Gallagher, Ideologies of Professionalism and the Politics
of Self-Regulation in the California State Bar, 22 PEPP. L. REV. 485, 492 (1995)(describing self-regulating professional organizations, such as bar associations, as
"collective voices of often powerful professions... [that] potentially wield enormous
influence in society... [and] clearly play a prominent role in shaping and
articulating professional values and ideology").
173 See Ramirez, supra note 17, at 543 ("[The] combination of primary industry
self-regulation with close government supervision and government-backed
enforcement has proven to be a powerful recipe for high standards of professional
conduct."); see also Seligman, supra note 112, at 1347 ("Far from being a panacea,
industry self-regulation subject to SEC supervision generally has been effective in
its major applications when the Commission has been willing to threaten or actually
use its regulatory authority to create incentives for securities industry self-
regulation.").
174 See generally JOHN F. SUTTON, JR. & JOHN S. DZIENKOWSKI, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON THE PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF LAWYERS 20-21 (2d ed. 2002)
(stating that although it may be difficult to legislate morality, the Model Rules have
the virtue of creating an external effect on attorney conduct in addition to any
internal morality-based constraints).
175 See, e.g., Ramirez, supra note 17, at 543-44 (recognizing that
professionalization in the securities brokerage field by way of self-regulation in
response to the "SEC and the prospect of further federal legislation" yielded a code of
conduct that "both protects customers and allows the industry to impose efficient
business practices").
176 This "club" atmosphere is certainly manifest in the extreme racial and
gender homogeneity at the apex of corporate governance. See supra note 154 and
accompanying text.
1006 [Vol. 79:977
2005] RETHINKING THE CORPORATION (AND RACE)
competency.177 A value for the full success of the enterprise
should thereby supplant the current model of CEO primacy.178
These professionals can be trained to exploit mass investment
opportunities and to avoid externalities. 179 The idea of simply
running a corporation for the exclusive benefit of the corporation
could become an anathema similar to churning in the securities
brokerage industry.180 Those managers who violate these
professional norms could face sanction or bars. Therefore, while
professionalization is not likely to eliminate all problems with
corporate management, there is good reason to believe that it
could move corporate governance closer to an optimal structure 1 '
and help quell externalization of costs while encouraging a more
proficient vision of mass investment opportunities. 8 2
Moreover, given the history of corporate reform,
professionalization is likely to outshine other options being
tapped to remedy corporate misanthropy. Most recently, SOX
has been subject to mixed reviews and seems to be of dubious
efficacy in terms of sustainable reform of corporate governance.
8 3
177 The securities brokerage industry requires examinations and continuing
professional education. See, e.g., Ramirez, supra note 17, at 537-38, 540-42, 547-48.
178 See supra notes 84-96 and accompanying text (emphasizing the sway of
corporate management's special interests over corporate governance and asserting
the need for more depoliticized regulatory framework).
179 In fact, if a legal framework existed to exploit mass investment endeavors, it
would likely be a success. Unlike many securities-brokerage standards, a standard
to seek out and exploit investment opportunities is not counter to the self-interest of
the professional as are churning prohibitions and suitability requirements. See
Ramirez, supra note 17, at 544-46.
180 See id. at 545-46 ("The prohibition against 'churning' precludes a broker
from using control over a customer's account to generate excessive trading
activity .... [T]he SEC long ago recognized that a broker may inappropriately
control an account even in the absence of a formal grant of discretionary trading
authority.").
181 See KRAAKMAN ET AL., supra note 6, at 38 (recognizing consensus among
commentators that "good corporate governance depends on numerous 'best
practices"' and listing several such practices).
182 See supra note 179 and accompanying text. Articulating the precise contours
of professional requirements is beyond the scope of this Article. At a minimum,
however, this Article suggests a qualification exam, a continuing education
requirement, membership of all managers in a self-regulatory organization
empowered to mete out sanctions, and adherence to a comprehensive code of conduct
that reflects the best learning of the science of corporate governance and the role of
the corporation. See supra notes 112-40 and accompanying text (discussing
standards and obligations that potential professionalization of corporate governance
entails).
183 See Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack
Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1602 (2005) (describing SOX as "seriously
1007
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
Imposing judicial rigor upon corporate governance is as likely to
lead to political backlash as it is to reform effectively the
corporation as an institution.18 4  The SEC seems politically
incapable of leading any sort of broad corporate reform as special
interests appear to have inordinate sway over that agency under
normal circumstances. 8 5 One must turn the pages of history all
the way back to the Great Depression in order to observe
fundamental and sustainable reform taking root. 18 6
Consequently, professionalizing the corps of officers and directors
at the pinnacle of corporate America could be a viable reform
strategy for the next time that a precipitous erosion in investor
confidence threatens the macroeconomy and prompts legislative
reform activity. 8 7  Therefore, reformers should recognize
professionalization as a possible means both to enhance
corporate performance and to secure greater diversity in
corporate America. 88
CONCLUSION
At its foundations, the modern corporation is a powerful tool
for economic progress and is sound from both a microeconomic
and macroeconomic perspective. None of the problems associated
with the modern corporation inhere to these foundational
elements. Instead, the problems flow from issues of
externalization, internalization, and governance-issues that
misconceived").
184 This is essentially what occurred when the Smith v. Van Gorkom decision-
finding outside directors liable-was issued. See supra notes 129-30 and
accompanying text.
185 See ARTHUR LEVITT WITH PAULA DWYER, TAKE ON THE STREET: WHAT WALL
STREET AND CORPORATE AMERICA DON'T WANT YOU TO KNOW 236 (2002) ("During
my... years in Washington, .. . nothing astonished me more than witnessing the
powerful special interest groups in full swing when they thought a proposed rule or a
piece of legislation might hurt them, giving nary a thought to how the proposal
might help the investing public.").
186 See Ramirez, supra note 25, at 34 ("[T]he Crash of 1929 and the ensuing
Great Depression led to the New Deal, which provided for wide-ranging federal
regulation of financial markets .... ).
187 See id. at 33-34 (highlighting the federal government's economic
intervention following the 2001 terrorist attacks, describing them as "intended to
stem panic: panic that was reflected in investor psychology, which... had eroded to
a point that had negatively and manifestly influenced stock market performance").
188 See Ramirez, supra note 18, at 1583-84 (identifying obstacles preventing
greater corporate racial diversification and pointing to SOX as "a wasted opportunity
to disrupt legally the homosocial reproduction that plagues board selection
processes").
1008 [Vol. 79:977
2005] RETHINKING THE CORPORATION (AND RACE)
plague all conceivable business forms, and indeed, humanity
generally. Oftentimes, governance issues and agency costs are a
struggle against greed. Greed is inherent to humans, not the
corporation. It is true that the corporation is insatiable, but that
simply means that the legal infrastructure around the
corporation must take this into account as it must with humans
generally. Law is responsible for creating structures that
channel such greed productively.
The thesis of this Article is if law can resolve such issues, at
least to the maximum extent possible, then the corporation can
operate to advance broad societal goals. Indeed, a properly
structured corporate law holds the promise of solving many of the
most challenging problems, such as race. Professionalizing the
management of public companies may facilitate such a resolution
of the externalization, internalization, and governance
challenges. Yet instead of a professionalized corps of managers,
our corporate sector seemingly teeters on the edge of a CEO
primacy model. Such a model is unsustainable as investors will
not continue to permit CEOs to garner a disproportionate share
of corporate earnings. Professionalization is not a cure-all, but it
can serve to trump the exclusive atmosphere that currently rules
corporate America. This should help put an end to homosocial
reproduction, excessive externalization, excessive agency costs,
and a lack of mass investment.
These outcomes would allow America to continue to make
racial progress. Professionalism could mean a less exclusive
class of corporate managers, which would encourage diversity
throughout the corporation. Finally, a professionally managed
public corporation sector could begin to think about methods of
mass investment that could help resolve the economic albatross
that is race in America.
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